Previous scholarship on American federalism has largely focused on the national government's increasingly conflictual relationship with the states. While some studies have explored the rise of mandates at the state level, there has been comparatively less attention on state-local relationships. Using a new survey of mayors, we explore variations in local government attitudes towards their state governments. We find some evidence that, regardless of partisanship, mayors in more conservative states are unhappy about state funding and-especially-regulations. More strikingly, we also uncover a partisan mismatch in which Democratic mayors provide especially negative ratings of their state's funding and-even more strongly-regulations. These findings have important implications for state-local relations as cities continue to become more Democratic and Republicans increasingly dominate state-level contests.
In a climate of rising partisan polarization at the state and federal levels (McCarty et al. 2006; Abramowitz 2010; Shor and McCarty 2011) , cities are increasingly tackling pressing economic and environmental challenges. In some states, cities' move towards policy innovation has been accompanied by increased state-local conflict, as ideologically opposed state governments push against local policies with which they disagree. Alabama and Oklahoma, for example, have banned cities from providing paid sick leave for workers, while Texas prevents its local governments from pursuing a whole host of policies surrounding issues like gun control and the environment (Dewan 2015) . We know relatively little, however, about these contentious state-local relationships, and about the extent to which partisan polarization affects them.
Indeed, previous research has focused primarily on federal-state conflict. This work emphasizes the evolution of state-federal relations from cooperative to conflictual (Elazar 1962; Cho and Wright 2001; Conlan 2006; Kincaid 1990 Kincaid , 2008 Kincaid , 2012 . Much of this scholarship highlights an increasingly frosty state-national relationship attributable to reductions in federal funding and increases in federal regulations. While some scholars in this field briefly mention local government and/or imply that findings about state-federal relations may apply to local government, cities and their leaders remain largely absent from this literature.
The evidence we do have on local governments suggests that they are experiencing similar conflict with the federal and-especially-state levels. A large body of scholarship has documented the increasing fiscal abandonment of cities by the state and federal level (Eisinger 1998; Dreier et al. 2004 ) and suggests that they are largely unable to influence the legislative process (Dreier et al. 2004; Weir et al. 2005; Gamm and Kousser 2013) . Moreover, their relationship with state government may be especially conflictual because of policy overlap (Peterson 1995; Frug and Barron 2008) . This research, however, generally understudies variations in state-local relationships (and how rising partisan polarization might drive these variations).
To further explore the relationship between partisanship and state-local relationships, we analyze data from a novel survey of mayors. Because virtually all interviews were conducted in person or over the phone, we are able to provide a mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence. We find that mayors are unhappy with funding and especially regulations from state governments-consistent with previous scholarship suggesting a conflictual state-local relationship. We also reveal that these conflictual relationships vary depending upon the partisanship of the state government and the mayor. Mayors in conservative states are generally somewhat less happy with funding and (again especially) regulations from their states regardless of mayoral partisanship. Most consistently (and perhaps unsurprisingly), however, Democratic mayors in conservative states were particularly displeased with their treatment by their state governments. Given cities' disproportionately Democratic political elites (Gerber and Hopkins 2011) and voting populations (Badger et al. 2016) , these findings suggest that cities in red states may struggle to implement innovative progressive policies. In a context of increasingly prominent state-local conflict, these findings suggest that sharper ideological divides between city and state elites heighten intergovernmental tensions.
CONFLICTUAL FEDERALISM
In his seminal work, Elazar (1962) notes that "virtually all the activities of government in the nineteenth-century United States were cooperative endeavors, shared in much the same manners as governmental programs are in the twentieth century" (1). Prior to the 1970s, warm state-federal relations were largely based on generous federal aid (Cho and Wright 2001; Conlan 2006 ). Elazar, however, saw the potential for a new, cooler era in American federal relations with government regulation-rather than (or attached to) federal aid-more likely to characterize American federalism. Kincaid's (1990 Kincaid's ( , 2008 research confirms that this rise in federal regulation augured a shift in state-federal relations in the 1970s. Specifically, this work highlights movement away from the cooperative federalism that characterized earlier decades toward a more conflictual relationship between the powerful federal government and the involuntarily compliant states. Perhaps most saliently, conflictual federalism includes a shift in federal aid distribution. Rather than focusing on places, federal support is increasingly centered on persons or groups (Conlan 2006; Kincaid 2008) . Moreover, funding increasingly features accompanying regulations that condition its use. Finally, congressional earmarking has become a mainstay of federal aid.
In addition to these changes in federal aid, scholars have also observed a marked rise in the preemption of state powers. A disproportionate share of federal laws claiming functions that were previously left to the states have been passed in recent years, leading to heightened federal regulation of the state (Zimmerman 2005; Conlan 2006 ). Researchers have also highlighted mandates as an important component of conflictual federalism. A mandate is "a direct order from the federal government requiring state and local governments to execute a federal policy" (Kincaid 2008, 15) . If violated, the federal government can institute civil or criminal penalties on state and local officials. A wealth of scholarship confirms that these trends have spurred increasingly frosty state-federal relations (Cho and Wright 2001; Kincaid 1990 Kincaid , 2008 Kincaid , 2012 Posner 2007; Pickerill and Bowling 2014) .
The same incentives and capacity to exert influence over lower levels of government exist-and may even be greater-at the state level. Indeed, as creatures of the state, local governments' powers stem from their state governments (Frug 1980) . This relationship does not include the same vertical separation of powers protections that the Constitution affords the states to (at least somewhat) ensure their sovereignty from Washington. Perhaps even more so than the federal government, then, states have the ability to limit policy innovation from local government (Frug and Barron 2008) , and have increasingly employed the same sorts of mandates that have engendered state hostility towards the federal government (Berke and French 1993; Shaffer 1995; Norton 2005) . In addition to possessing greater capacity to impinge upon the legal powers of cities, state government functions are more likely to overlap with cities' relative to the national government (Peterson 1995) . This overlap may make it less clear which entity should optimally perform a particular governing task and generate competition between the two levels of government over ownership of particular functions.
Finally, in many instances, urban-rural divides may provide natural factions that pit state governments against the cities underneath them, and/or political homogeneity may make it easier for a faction at the state level to set aside urban interests (Gamm and Kousser 2013) .
Thus, state-local conflict may, in fact, be even greater than that between states and the federal government.
Indeed, the recent proliferation of state preemption laws mentioned in the opening of this article underscores the potential for tensions between state and local government over regulations writ large. While there have been, to date, no systematic studies quantifying the frequency of state preemption, recent academic and journalistic evidence highlight the wide array of policy arenas these preemption laws cover. State preemptions of local government powers are typically a state response to a local government initiative at odds with the state's ideological preferences. For example, cities across the country have adopted higher minimum wages-in some cases as high as $15 per hour. While many states have allowed these laws to stand, others have immediately (often preemptively) moved to prevent local governments from adopting local wage ordinances. Madison, WI, Birmingham, AL, and St. Louis, MO's efforts to raise their minimum wage were followed by state legislative efforts to preclude local governments from passing such legislation (Schragger 2016, 149) States have similarly moved to block local government autonomy in the environmental realm. After the city of Denton, TX passed a fracking ban, the state legislature in Texas immediately responded with a preemption law prohibiting local regulation of fracking (Greenblatt 2016) . Prior to his election, Republican governor Greg Abbott complained that local environmental laws generally were harmful to Texas: "Texas is being Californianized and you may not even be noticing it. It's being done at the city level with bag bans, fracking bans, tree-cutting bans. We're forming a patchwork quilt of bans and rules and regulations that is eroding the Texas model" (Tilove 2015) .
Finally, these state-local battles have also been fought over social policy. Perhaps most notably, after the Charlotte City Council passed legislation that extended civil-rights protections to its lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community, the state legislature in North Carolina met in a special session to block local governments from adopting antidiscrimination protections for LGBT people (the law also prevents cities from setting their own minimum wages) (Greenblatt 2016) . States have similarly waged battles with cities over gun laws; in Arizona, for example, one law punishes local governments-like Tucson-that have kept gun regulations in place that contradict preempting state law with the removal of local public officials and penalties up to $50,000 (Greenblatt 2016 ).
All of the examples provided above-and indeed, the overwhelming majority of those featured in media and academic coverage over the past five years-feature Republican states preempting progressive legislation. This is not to suggest that Republican states are the only ones limiting cities; in 2008, Democrats in California banned cities from requiring restaurants to include nutritional information on their menus (Dewan 2015) . But, recent Republican dominance at the state level-Republicans have gained over 900 seats in state legislative contests since 2010 (Cillizza 2015) and currently control thirty-three of the state's fifty governor's seats (Mishak and Wieder 2016) -means that Republican states have greater opportunity to pass such legislation. Moreover, as we outline further below, there may be partisan incentives that would render Republican governments particularly inclined to limit local government autonomy.
RISING PARTISAN POLARIZATION AND STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIPS
We know relatively little about whether there are variations in the extent to which states and local governments experience conflict. While some evidence suggests that differences in state regulatory environments might allow for greater local policy innovation (Frug and Barron 2008) , there has been comparatively little analysis of how ideological differences might generate variations in state-local partnerships. The rise of national partisan polarization and its capacity to obstruct policy implementation has been well-documented (McCarty et al. 2006; Abramowitz 2010 ). What's more, we know that increasing partisan polarization has trickled down to the state level (Shor and McCarty 2011) and generated federal-state conflict when the partisan alignments of the two units of government do not match (Kincaid 2012; Pickerill and Bowling 2014 states designed to limit the ability of cities to pass left-leaning legislation-and the fact that the conservative American Legislative Exchange Council has drafted model preemption bills for state lawmakers- (Dewan 2015; Hertel-Fernandez and Skocpol 2016; Rapoport 2016) provides preliminary empirical confirmation of this prediction.
SURVEY OF MAYORS
To evaluate the relationship between partisanship and state-local conflict, we use evidence from the 2015 Menino Survey of Mayors, which included questions about other levels of government. The survey's target population was medium and large cities (100,000+ residents).
In close collaboration with Boston University's Initiative on Cities and the US Conference of Mayors (USCM), we reached out to all 288 mayors of U.S. cities over 100,000 people.
Before the 2015 summer USCM meetings, we contacted each attending mayor (by email with phone follow up). We invited each of these mayors to set up an in-person interview at the conference or to set up a phone call at a more convenient time. The USCM sent its own email about the survey to all members and made an announcement at the first day's lunch session. All conference interviews were conducted in person directly with the mayor. After the conference we contacted the rest of the target population mayors in similar ways leading to a number of phone interviews (and a few electronic completions) throughout the summer.
Overall, eighty-nine mayors participated. Since most of our data were collected in person on the phone, we know it comes directly from mayors rather than from staff. Sixty-three responding mayors belonged to our target population (288 cities over 100,000) which translates to a 22 percent response rate from large/medium size city mayors. The remaining responses are from mayors of smaller cities replying to USCM outreach. We opted to include these responses from the non-target population in our analyses for two reasons. First, recruiting elite samples is extremely challenging, making us reluctant to throw away data. Second, and more importantly, although these mayors lead somewhat smaller cities, their participation in a national conference that skews toward larger cities implies that they see self identify as leaders of policymaking cities rather than smaller towns, and are thus more likely to have thought about and/or been affected by their relationship with state and federal government.
Using a combination of demographic data from the U.S. Census' American Community Survey, 2 data on Democratic vote share (Einstein and Kogan 2016) , and information on state legal context (Hoene and Pagano 2015) , we show in Table 1 that participating cities look a lot like the wider universe of American cities. The third column summarizes the target population (all cities over 100,000). The other columns allow us to compare these traits to the total sample and the sample excluding the smaller city mayors. from "much less than average (1)" to "well above average (5)." To assess mayors' views on regulations of their cities, we asked: "Compared to an average city, how much do you expect laws and regulations (existing and new) from other governments to limit your city's policy making autonomy and flexibility?"As with the previous question, for both the state and federal government, mayors could then provide responses ranging from "more restrictive than average (1)" to "less restrictive than average (5)."
Note that both of these questions ask mayors to rate their experiences with federalism "compared to an average city." Without that phrasing, we feared-particularly on the question about finances-that we would be more likely to hear uniformly negative evaluations of federalism from mayors. By priming mayors to consider their cities' positions relative their peers', we hoped to elicit more nuanced assessments that reflect their actual experiences with their state and federal governments relative to the plausible baseline of an average city rather than an idealized notion of funding and autonomy levels.
In addition to these closed-ended questions, we also included open-ended questions that assess the state and federal policies that mayors find especially problematic. We asked: "In your role as mayor, what one state (federal) law would you most like to see repealed or changed?" Because the vast majority of our surveys were conducted in person or over the phone, we were able to elicit elaborations on both sets of questions that allow us to provide more qualitative evidence surrounding the cross-tabulations presented below.
In using a survey to measure local assessments of the state and federal government, we provide one measure of intergovernmental relations. There are, of course, a number of other ways to measure these relationships; we seek here to provide one operationalization. Cho and Wright (2001) outline the value of conducting these kinds of surveys when describing their own analysis of state administrator attitudes in a similar context: "The extent of national influence perceived by state administrators is one operational indicator of intergovernmental relationships. Whether their perceptions of intergovernmental relations correctly reflect reality is another question. What these agency heads see and how they act in response to their perceptions of the intergovernmental world is, in fact, one dimension of reality" (63).
Our research follows a growing literature that surveys elites to uncover important information about relationships between political actors and local policymaking agendas (Cho and Wright 2001; Gerber et al. 2013; Gerber 2013; Einstein and Glick 2016) .
RESULTS
We begin by providing a descriptive overview of mayors' attitudes towards their state and federal governments. This brief summary serves to both confirm the literature's expectations that we should observe greater local hostility towards state government, and (in the
case of our open-ended questions) provide greater elaboration on the policy arenas that comprise this state-local conflict. We then move towards testing our key predictions concerning partisanship's impact on mayors' relationships with their state governments. icant, and hold when we run statistical models including a variety of controls (models can be found in Table 4 in the supplementary appendix).
While we do not have longitudinal data to more rigorously assess this argument, qualitative statements from mayors suggest that this negativity towards states may be part of an adverse trend. One mayor of a medium-sized city described hostile city-state relations as "accelerating [in] the last five years." Another mayor of a large city similarly cited a five-year timeline, though he suggested an even steeper trend: "I think that the legislature of [state redacted] would abolish cities if they could, and that's....a 180-degree change from the policies of five years ago. This was probably one of the more progressive states in terms of support for local government authority." A mayor of a small city did not cite a specific timeline for increasing state impingement on local autonomy, but agreed with his peers that such regulations did appear to be worsening: "The general assembly can set aside home rule.
They increasingly do that. We're descending slowly down a slope of average (referring to our scale) because the general assembly screws around with home rule more often than not."
Turning to the open-ended questions about the federal and state policies mayors would like to see changed confirms: (1) restrictive regulatory policies on the part of both the federal and state governments, and (2) greater restriction on the part of the state government.
Starting at the federal level, a significant portion of mayors were especially concerned about mandates. Fourteen mayors specifically cited U.S. Environmental Protection Agency rules as being "unfunded mandates" with a disproportionate impact on urban areas. Given that most mayors are Democrats, many of these complaints about the EPA come from those who are likely ideologically inclined to support its goals. Interestingly, however, many mayors also cited laws that they would like to become stronger and/or more standardized at the federal level-in contrast with much of the research on state-federal conflict. The next most frequently cited laws, in order, were gun laws (seven mentions), immigration laws (seven mentions), and marijuana legislation (six mentions). In all cases, mayors wanted more leftleaning and/or standardized policies at the federal level. To ameliorate the consequences of patchwork state-level policies and achieve more liberal policy goals, mayors were, in some cases, willing to endorse stronger federal policy. While Kincaid (2008) found that state and local administrators often advocate for stronger standards in their policy fields, our research suggests that the same may be true for elected officials, and that support for stronger federal standards may stretch across multiple policies rather than single issues.
In contrast, the state regulations that mayors wanted repealed were almost uniformly restrictions on local autonomy and/or capacity to generate revenue. Nineteen mayors wanted to repeal or change laws relating to local revenue options. Eight mayors hoped to change the distribution of revenues and another eight wanted to address limitations on local autonomy.
Six mayors mentioned restrictions on pension programs as being problematic. The only frequently cited policy where mayors wanted to see greater state regulation was gun control, which received five mentions (though in some places even gun control is an issue where states are blocking cities). This greater negativity towards state regulation manifests not only in the types of laws that were top mayoral considerations, but also in the ease with which mayors were able to provide a law to change when asked. Ten mayors were unable to proffer a single federal law that they wanted to see repealed or changed when asked. In contrast, only two mayors similarly struggled when asked about state regulations. Many implied they had a much longer list to provide than the survey asked for.
Taken in concert, these results confirm previous scholarly findings, and, in doing so, help bolster the validity of our survey instrument. Indeed, the fact that mayors are rating higher levels of government in ways that are so strikingly consistent with well-documented prior research suggests that we are tapping into real local preferences on state (and federal) governments. with their states' were twenty percentage points more likely to say that they had "much less" autonomy compared to their peers with matched partisanship or divided state governments.
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The differences are almost as large when using the more lenient measure of any negative (less or much less) response variable.
To further hone in on the extent to which partisan mismatch versus partisan control of state government helps to explain mayoral frustration with state government, we turn to category, too, revealing that partisan mismatch, irrespective of which party controls which government, also helps explain extreme unhappiness with state regulations. When we take into account the proportion of mayors who believed that they had "less" autonomy than average, the story is fairly similar. Once again, Democratic mayors in Democratic states appeared to be happiest with their state governments, with only one-third selecting the "less"
category. Over sixty percent of Republican and Democratic mayors in Republican states opted for one of the two negative response options as did seventy five percent of Republican mayors in Democratic states. In sum, partisan mismatch is most consistently associated with negative responses, especially about autonomy. At the same time, Republican control of state government also tends to induce frustration over preemption among both Democratic and Republican city leaders.
To supplement these cross-tabulations, we estimated regression models to explain the variations in views about state level support and autonomy restrictions. Table 3 illustrates the main effects of mayoral partisanship, state leanings, and the interaction between the two. 5 Unlike in the plots above, which focus on negative and very negative views, the dependent variable in these models is the full five-point scale of the mayors' assessments of higher levels of government. The results provide limited evidence of a state partisan effect.
While the main effect of Republican state government-which in these models represents the effect of Republican states on Republican mayors-is negative for both the state financial support and state restrictions dependent variables, the coefficient estimates fall well short of statistical significance. Confidence bands are wide because of the relatively low number of
Republican mayors in our sample (reflecting the comparatively low number of Republican mayors nationwide); we thus take these results to be tentative at best.
[Insert 2 All ACS data are 2012 5-year estimates.
3 Some of this may be a function of question wording since all cities are subject to the same federal limitations and thus respondents may gravitate towards the middle category (which may be the "correct"
answer most of the time). On the other hand, at least some mayors did deviate from the middle based on the interactions between policy goals they hoped to accomplish and the federal laws that affected all cities. Moreover, the fact that all cities face the same federal regulations is a positive feature of the design that allows for a common baseline. The lower ratings for state government capture the mayors' frustration (whether based in reality or mere perception) that they are more commonly blocked by the states than the federal government.
4 While our experience suggests that the responses to these questions were thoughtful and that the direct interpretation of the findings is the correct one, we do note that cannot refute the possibility that in some cases broader negative feelings about rivals in state government drive negative responses to these specific queries.
5 While we present a limited set of controls in the main text to avoid potential model over-saturation, in Table 5 (located in the appendix), we present models with additional institutional controls: city institutional form (strong mayor vs. council manager) and state legal context. None of our key results change in magnitude, though our marginally significant interaction term loses statistical significance due to wider standard errors. Data are from 2012 American Community Survey, Einstein and Kogan (2016) , and Hoene and Pagano (2015) . 
